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CaseNo.20110436-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.

KELLY ROBBENNOLT,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from his conviction for forgery, a third degree
felony.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2) (West 2009). This Court has

jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
1. Was there sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that
Defendant was guilty of forgery?
Standard of Review. "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the
evidence, [an appellate court] must sustain the trial court's judgment unless
it is against the clear weight of the evidence," or if the court otherwise
reaches "a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State
v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75, ^ 10,197 P.3d 628 (quoting State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, ]
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5, 84 P.3d 1167) (internal quotations omitted). A trial court's interpretation
of binding case law is reviewed for correctness. State v. Stewart, 2011 UT App
185, If 6, 257 P.3d 1055 (quoting State v. Richardson, 843 R2d 517, 518 (Utah
App. 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statute is attached at Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (West Supp. 2011) (forgery)'
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Summary of Facts
Defendant promises a secured investment
In early 2008, Defendant was a neighbor of Brent Mangum's and a
partner in an investment company, American Star Lending. R110:128.
•I

Defendant was also involved in Keystone Venture Group, a rapidly
deteriorating partnership with Douglas Scott Abbott. See R110:23, 25-27, 29.
Mangum entered into a junior partnership agreement with American

(

Star Lending in April, 2008. R110:130, R i l l (Def. Ex. 3). The partnership
1

Stylistic changes were made to the relevant section of the forgery
statute after Defendant committed the offense. Because the amendments do
not affect the analysis of this case, the State cites to the current code section.

<

2

Consistent with appellate standards, the State recites the facts in the
light most favorable to the trial court's findings. See State v. Larsen, 2000 UT
App 106, \ 2, 999 P.2d 1252.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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y

agreement was signed by Defendant's business partner, Sam Kassir.

Rill

(Def. Ex. 3, p. 9). But Mangum testified that his dealings were "almost
exclusively" with Defendant, whom he understood to be a partner in
American Star Lending. R110:174; Rlll(Defendant Ex. 1). The agreement
stated that Mangum's "investment shall be secured by a deed of trust against
a property" and that a promissory note and deed of trust "shall be issued."
R i l l (Def. Ex. 3, p. 4). It said that Mangum would receive monthly interest
payments and would be trained in the land development business. Id.
Defendant, however, did not produce the promised security interest
for the $130,000 Mangum invested in May 2008, nor for the $42,000
investment he made in October 2008.4 R110:129-30. Mangum started asking
questions in December 2008, after the monthly interest payments stopped.
R110:131. Defendant could not explain why the payments stopped, but told
Mangum that Kassir had agreed to facilitate the payments. R110:131-32.
Unsatisfied, Mangum pushed for documentation of his security interest. He
wanted to know "where the money is and what [his] recourse was."
R110:132.

3

Kassir is also referred to as Hassan in some documents.

4

The agreement was for a $200,000 investment, but Mangum only
invested $172,000.
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Finally, in mid-January 2009, Defendant gave Mangum a "Partial
Assignment of Deed of Trust" to property in Townsend, Montana.5
R110:133-34; R i l l (St. Ex. A). The deed seemed suspicious to Mangum.
R110.133-35; R i l l (St. Ex. A). It was signed December 3, 2007 - several
months before Mangum had agreed to invest any money. See id. It was
notarized in Utah County, not Montana where the property was located. See
id. And it was signed by Douglas Scott Abbott, a man with whom Mangum
had no prior dealings. See id.
When Mangum confronted

Defendant about the irregularities,

Defendant said "[gjive that back to me and I will fix it." R110:135. Mangum
demanded a properly recorded deed, but Defendant replied that "it would
take at least two weeks, it would cost $500[,] and that he couldn't go through
the normal course but [that] what he would get [Mangum] would suffice."
R110:136.

Defendant also discouraged Mangum from contacting Abbott.

R110:137.

Defendant alleged that Abbott was trying to steal Defendant's

home and ruin his reputation. R110:137-38. Mangum eventually decided to
contact Abbott anyway. R110:139.

5

This property is also described in exhibits as 299 acres in Broadwater
County, Montana. See generally Rill.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The "secured investment" is unsecured
Abbott, meanwhile, had learned that Defendant was trying to raise
money from Mangum.

Abbott tried, at first unsuccessfully, to contact

Mangum to warn him about Defendant. R110:27-28. When the two finally
met, Abbott told Mangum that he had not signed the deed of trust. R110:30,
140.
Defendant, meanwhile, told Mangum that Abbott was lying and that
the deed was a "good document/'

When Mangum pushed

for

documentation of the promised security interest, Defendant gave him
documents describing ownership of the Montana property. The documents
contained "a lot of people's names/' but not Mangum's. R110:141, 154-55.
Mangum contacted the investor who owned the majority of the Montana
property. R110:141. The investor did not know who Mangum was and was
unaware of any other liens or encumbrances. Id.
As Mangum pressed for answers, Defendant "sent all sorts of e-mails
with deadlines and demands." R110:151. Defendant asserted that although
the Montana property was listed in Abbott's name, it was an asset owned by
Keystone Venture Group.

R110:153.

Defendant said Abbott held the

property on behalf of Keystone. R110:164. Defendant said that before their
business relationship deteriorated, Abbott would "often sign multiple, partial

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
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notarized deeds of trusts" for Defendant to fill out at later dates.6 R110:164.
Defendant further told Mangum that American Star Lending had a $300,000
interest in the Montana property, "with a signed, notarized deed of trust."
R110.164. Defendant asserted that Abbott had "simply asked the company to
provide a direct deed of trust for [Mangum] from Keystone/' rather than
place Mangum's name on the American Star Lending deed.7 R110:164.
Defendant initially told Mangum that his investment was with
Keystone. R110:174. Mangum was worried because Abbott told him that
Keystone "was in deep trouble." R110:174. But Defendant then assured
Mangum that his investment was safe because it was with American Star
Lending, and not Keystone. R110:174. Abbott testified that he did not know
who Mangum had invested with, and, as of trial, Keystone investors had not
received any of the money from the Montana property. R110:34, 76.

6

Abbott denied this. R110: 91-92.

7

Abbott testified that he "never agreed to sign any document for Brent
Mangum." R110:94, 112. He also never authorized an interest for Kassir or
American Star Lending. R110:lll. Kassir was apparently brought on as a
Keystone consultant at some point. R i l l (Def. Ex. 7, p. 1).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(

Defendant's role in Keystone
Abbott met Defendant through a church friend, and the three went
into business together, forming Keystone Venture Group, Inc.8 R110:21-23.
Abbott's role was as investor and shareholder. R110:23-24. In 2006, Abbott
first invested between $5,000 and $6,000 for a project in La Verkin. R110:22.
All company shares were initially placed in Abbott's name because
Defendant "had this outstanding issue with the IRS, and he said he couldn't
own any assets in his name because of it." R110:24. Abbott did all the signing
for the business, which Defendant operated. Id.
A deed of trust on property in Townsend, Montana had been
purchased for $965,000 to secure the more than $1.5 million that Abbott and
his friends and family had invested in Keystone. R110:32. The deed of trust
was recorded in Abbott's name, and an interest was given to all of the
"Abbott related investors." R110:32-33. However, there were errors in the
documentation; so in fall 2007, Defendant asked Abbott to notarize deeds of
trust to correct those errors. R110:88. Abbott signed the notarized deeds of
trust solely to correct errors with existing deeds assigned to the then-existing
"Abbott related investors." R110:88, 94-95.

Defendant was to fill in the

8

The third business partner withdrew at some point before the facts of
this case arose, leaving Abbott and Defendant equal partners.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
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names of the then-existing Abbott related investors and the amount that each
was owed. R110:88. Abbott testified that Defendant's authority to use his
notarized signature was limited to registering the Abbott related investors.
R110: 91-92.
Other than the limited scope for which the 2007 partial deed of trusts
were issued, Abbott testified that he did not give Defendant authority to use
his signature.

R110:94-95. Nor did he authorize Defendant to use his

signature to create an interest in the Montana property for Mangum, Kassir,
or American Star Lending. R110:94,111-12.
Keystone unravels
In early 2008, Abbott began to find out //troubling,/ things about
Defendant, and initiated steps to protect his investment. R110:25. In March,
2008, Defendant and Abbott entered into "Keystone Restructure Agreement
A" and "Stocks Purchase Agreement B." R i l l (Def. Exs. 1 & 2). The two
agreed to a list of "existing Company projects with contracts, options, or title
ownership". R i l l (Def. Ex. 1, p. 3). They agreed that Defendant would
continue to "lead, operate and manage Keystone" in the best interest of its
investors. Id. at 5. Defendant agreed to "consult with Abbott and seek his
approval" before entering into a real estate development relationship with a
Keystone or MCI Development contact. Id.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Abbott also sold half his Keystone shares to Defendant, in exchange for
Defendant's agreement to restructure and settle Keystone's more than $1.5
million in "Abbott Related Debt." R i l l (Def. Ex. 2, p. 2). Abbott took on a
consultant role with Keystone. Id. at 3. The relationship deteriorated and the
two partners became embroiled in litigation against each other.9 R110:29-30,
74; see also "Settlement Agreement" R i l l (Def. Ex. 10).
Abbott resigned from Keystone on August 5, 2008.

R110:25-26,

"Resignation, Settlement & Release Agreement" R i l l (Def. Ex. 7). Abbott
sought the return of the money he, his friends, and his relatives had invested
in Keystone. R110:79-80; R i l l (Def. Ex. 7). In the dissolution agreement, the
Montana property was described as being held in trust "for the benefit of
Abbott." R i l l (Def. Ex. 7, p. 1). The Montana property was to be sold, along
with other identified properties, "to repay [Abbott related] investors," who
were listed in Exhibit A. Id. at 3-4, 7; R110:80. Mangum was not on the list.
See id.
Defendant continues to use Abbott's signature
In spring 2009, several months after Abbott had resigned from
Keystone, David Nixon contacted Defendant about an investment he, his

9

The lawsuits were apparently related to Defendant's rental of a home
owned by Abbott. See R110:120-23.
-9-
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father, and his mother-in-law had made with Defendant. R110:179-81.
Defendant told Nixon that he "had about five notarized signatures of Scott
Abbott's . . . in his possession/' R110:182.

Nixon knew that Abbott and

Defendant had dissolved their business relationship and told Defendant that
he should return the documents. Defendant replied, "No, I don't need to do
that." R110:182-83.
Nixon informed Abbott that Defendant was using his notarized
signatures. R110:lll-12. When Abbott confronted Defendant, Defendant
asserted that he had the right to use the notarized documents. R110:35.
Abbott was "very concerned" that Defendant was using his signature
without permission. R110:lll-12. On February 10, 2010, Abbott entered into
a "Due Diligence & Evidence Agreement," in which Defendant affirmed that
he had destroyed all "known notarized documents."10 R110:89-90; R i l l (Def.
Ex. 15, p. 1). The agreement also provided proof of who held interests in the
Montana property. Id. at 3.

In a separate agreement, Kassir agreed to
i

relinquish American Star Lending's interest in the Montana property, and

10

Nixon's father, Charles Timothy, also held a deed of trust in the
Montana property, which was allegedly notarized by Abbott. See Rl 10:34,
186-87. The "Timothy" interest was not indicated in the 2008 "Resignation,
Settlement and Release Agreement" but was listed in the 2010 "Due
Diligence & Evidence Agreement" R i l l (Def. Ex's. 7, 15). Abbott was
apparently aware of this interest. See R110:33.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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i

Mangum, for the first time, was given an interest in the property.11 RllOllO11; R i l l (Def. Ex. 13). Although he had "never agreed to sign any document
for Brent Mangum/' Abbott testified that he later provided Mangum an
interest because he "felt very poorly for him" and "wanted to see him get
some money back." R110:94,110,112. As of trial, the Montana property had
yet to be liquidated, and the Keystone investors had not seen any return.
R110:34,76.
Summary of the Proceedings
Defendant was charged with one count of forgery, a third degree
felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (West Supp. 2011). Rl. Defendant
waived his right to a jury. R56. A bench trial was held on February 23, 2011.
R65-64, R110. In finding Defendant guilty, the court stated that Defendant
did "submit a document to Mr. Mangum, purporting to transfer an interest in
some property." R110:221. The court found that Defendant had no authority
to hand over the deed of trust on Abbott's behalf: "Mr. Abbott's signature
was needed because the property was in his name. . . .

At least in this

transaction, [Defendant] wasn't a signer." R110:222.
11

It is unclear from the record how, or when, Sam Kassir, on behalf of
American Star Lending, obtained a fractional share of the Montana property.
No such interest was listed in the 2008 Resignation, Settlement and Release
Agreement. See R i l l (Def. Ex. 7). Abbott testified that he found the interest
in a title search and that either Defendant or Kassir had produced "another
document" giving Kassir ownership. R110: 83; 112.
-11-
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The court further found no contractual relationship between Abbott
and Mangum. R110:223. Rather, Defendant "did this on his own. Normally
in business relationships, I would think, especially when that interest is gone,
that authority would still be out of respect and trust, at least asked of,
mentioned to, something/7 R110:223.
The court further found that Defendant used Abbott's signature
without permission in an attempt to defraud Mangum:
[Defendant] needed Mr. Abbott's signature; that authority wasn't
given. And, again, it seems to me that [Defendant] was trying to
do what he could to make things right. I think you get yourself
involved in these kind [sic] of things and you do things to try and
make it right and then you hope that later you can fix the
situation. This is a lot of money involved. And I think he was
trying to do the right thing but that doesn't detract from fact [sic]
that no authority [sic] to sign and he was trying to defraud in
accordance with what the elements are of the charge.
R110:223.12
Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of up to five
years in prison. R69. The sentence was suspended, and Defendant was
instead ordered to serve 120 days in jail and serve 36 months'
probation.13 R69-68. Defendant timely appealed. R72.

A copy of the transcript of the trial court's oral ruling is attached in
Addendum B.
13

Defendant has filed a separate appeal of an order to pay $247,200 in
restitution. That appeal is assigned Case No. 20110831-CA.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial
court's finding that he was guilty of forgery. Defendant first argues that the
trial court erroneously concluded that he acted with the purpose to defraud.
Defendant second challenges the trial court's finding that he lacked authority
to use Scott Abbott's signature.
This Court should not consider the merits of Defendant's claims
because he inadequately briefs them. Defendant also fails to marshal the
evidence. Defendant's fact statement omits most of the evidence against him.
Defendant's failure to marshal continues into his argument section where he
fails to mention, for example, that the scope of Abbott's permission to use his
signature was limited to correcting errors in existing deeds at the time he
signed them in 2007; that Abbott had ended his business relationship with
Defendant before Defendant issued the deed of trust to Brent Mangum using
Abbott's signature; and that Keystone had no contractual obligation to
Mangum. Nor does Defendant mention that at the time he issued the partial
deed to Mangum, his authority over the property was solely to liquidate it to
recoup existing Keystone investors' losses.

Defendant's briefing and

marshaling failures are reasons alone to affirm his conviction.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In any event, ample evidence in the record shows that Defendant
handed Mangum a document signed by Abbott, which Defendant had no
authority to use, and that Defendant did so to convince Mangum that his
investment was secured as promised in the investment agreement. These
facts support a reasonable inference that Defendant did so to forestall
Mangum from withdrawing his investment or taking legal action. The trial
court could reasonably conclude from these facts that Defendant acted with
the purpose to defraud Mangum.
ARGUMENT
THE MERITS OF DEFENDANT'S SUFFICIENCY OF THE
EVIDENCE CLAIMS SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED;
ALTERNATIVELY AMPLE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS HIS
FORGERY CONVICTION
"A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or
with knowledge that the person is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by
anyone, the person (a) alters any writing of another without his authority or
utters the altered writing; or (b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates,
issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that [it] . . . purports to be
the act of another; . . . [or] purports to be an act on behalf of another party
with the authority of that other party/7 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2) (West
Supp.2011).
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Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
forgery conviction. In so doing, he does not dispute that he issued a partial
deed of trust to which he attached a notarized signature of his former
business partner, Abbott. See R i l l (St. Ex. A). Defendant asserts only that (1)
there was insufficient evidence to prove that he had no authority to use
Abbott's signature and (2) the trial court "did not find . . . intent to defraud."
See Br.Aplt. at 11.
Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence should not be
considered, first, because he fails to adequately brief his claims. Second,
Defendant fails to marshal the evidence. Alternatively, ample evidence at
trial proved that Defendant did not have authority to use Abbott's signature.
Moreover, contrary to Defendant's claims, the trial court did find that he
acted with a purpose to defraud. See R110:223. The evidence also amply
supported that finding.
A. Defendant inadequately briefs his claims.
Defendant's insufficiency challenge should not be considered because
it is inadequately briefed.

An appellate "argument shall contain the

contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented,
including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial
court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record
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relied." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Rule 24(a)(9) "requires not just bald citation
to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis of that
authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)).
Appellate courts are not depositories where appellants "may dump the
burden of argument and research." Id. (citations omitted). This Court,
therefore, "will not address issues that are inadequately briefed." State v.
Nielsen, 2011 UT App 211,1 5,257 P.3d 1103 (citing Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304).
Defendant's brief sets out no legal analysis to support his contention
that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. For example,
Defendant claims that the evidence "conclusively shows" that he had
authority to use Abbott's signature "during the 2009 alleged forgery." See
Br.Aplt. at 16. But, rather than citing authority, Defendant merely restates his
trial interpretation of the evidence. See Br.Aplt at 16-24; R110:196-214
(Defendant's closing statement). Defendant also does not cite a single case to
support his claim.

Merely "setting forth selected facts from" trial and

"making conclusory statements," without legal analysis of those facts, does
not meet the requirements of rule 24. Angilau v. Winder, 2011 UT 13, | 28, 248
P.3d 975. This is reason alone to reject Defendant's claim.
The trial court found Defendant "was trying to defraud" when he gave
Mangum the partial deed of trust. R110:223. Yet, Defendant claims that the
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trial court did not make this finding.

See Br.Aplt. at 11.

Defendant

alternatively asserts that the trial court's finding is "clearly inconsistent" with
its statement that Defendant was "trying to do the right thing." See Br.Aplt. at
15. To support this contention, Defendant cites two cases: State v. Winward,
909 P.2d 909, 912-13 (Utah App. 1999) and State v. Turner, 282 P.2d 1045,1047
(Utah 1955). See Br.Aplt at 11-15. Defendant accurately states the rule from
those cases - that a forgery conviction requires a defendant to act with either
a purpose to defraud or knowledge of facilitating fraud.

See id. Yet,

Defendant does not apply that rule to the facts of his case. Instead, he merely
states that it would be "clearly inconsistent... as a matter of law" for a court
to find both that a defendant "was trying to do the right thing" and had the
requisite mental state to commit a forgery. See Br.Aplt. at 15. As stated
above, this "bald citation to authority" does not meet the requirements of
rule 24(a)(9).
This Court should therefore affirm.
B. Defendant fails to marshal the evidence.
This Court should also decline to consider the merits because
Defendant fails to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's
judgment.
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"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, [an
appellate court] must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the
clear weight of the evidence," or if the court otherwise reaches "a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Briggs, 2008 UT
75, % 10,197 R3d 628 (quoting State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, f 5, 84 P.3d 1167)
(internal quotations omitted). See also State v. Stewart, 2011 UT App 185, Tf 6,
257P.3dl055.
Defendant must, therefore, "marshal all record evidence that supports"
his conviction before he can attack its validity. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). See
also CacJie County v. Beus, 2005 UT App 503, \ 11, 128 P.3d 63. Proper
marshaling requires Defendant to "embrace" the position he opposes:
[Appellants] are required to temporarily remove their own
prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's position; they must
play the "devil's advocate." In so doing, appellants must present
the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court and not
attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their
case. . . . In sum, to properly marshal the evidence the
challenging party must demonstrate how the court found the
facts from the evidence and then explain why those findings
contradict the clear weight of the evidence.
United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Yonds, 2006 UT 35,
\

26, 140 P.3d 1200 (citations and internal quotations and alterations

omitted). This Court may and should rely on Defendant's failure to "perform
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this critical task" to affirm the trial court. Id. at f 27; State v. Clark, 2005 UT
75,Tfl7,124P.3d235.
Defendant acknowledges his duty to marshal, yet throughout his brief
ignores most of the evidence against him. Defendant claims he marshals by
citing to the trial court's explanation of its judgment. See Br.Aplt at 13-15,16.
But Defendant misses the point of marshaling.

Marshaling, at a

minimum, requires appellants to state the facts from trial that are contrary to
their position. Yet, most of the facts Defendant states throughout his brief are
presented in the context most favorable to his own position.

Moreover,

rather than citing to the facts and evidence adduced at trial, Defendant
largely cites to the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. See
Br.Aplt. at 6-9,19, 21-23. When reviewing a sufficiency challenge to a verdict,
this Court may consider "only the evidence presented at trial." See State v.
Andreason, 2001 UT App 395, Tj 4, n.2, 38 P.3d 982 (citing cases emphasizing
that sufficiency of evidence claims must be based on evidence presented at
trial).
Defendant's "tactic of simply rearguing and recharacterizing the trial
court's factual findings does not constitute marshaling." Clark, 2005 UT 75, f
17. Defendant cannot "shift the burden of marshaling by falsely claiming
there is no evidence in support of the trial court's findings." Chen v. Stewart,
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2004 UT 82, If 78,100 P.3d 1177. See also Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, Tf33, 20
P.3d 332 (declining to consider issue where appellant lists "only the facts that
she believes contradict or undermine the district court's ruling").
"The purpose of this rigorous and strict requirement" is two-fold:
"efficiency and fairness." Chen, 2004 UT 82, ^ 79 (citing Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida
Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1053-54 (Utah App. 1994))
(internal citations omitted). Marshaling "promotes efficiency by avoiding
'retrying the facts7 and by assisting the appellate court in its 'decision-making
and opinion writing/" Id.

Likewise, marshaling "promotes fairness by

requiring that the appellants bear the expense and time of marshaling the
evidence rather than putting the appellee in the 'precarious position' of
performing the appellant's work at 'considerable time and expense/" Id.
"This deference to a trial court's findings . . . fosters the principle that
appellants rather than appellees bear the greater burden on appeal." Id.
Defendant's brief suggests that Defendant issued Mangum the partial
deed of trust in the regular course of his Keystone management duties while
Abbott was a partner in Keystone. See Br.Aplt. at 6-9, 22-24. But that account
directly conflicts with the testimony at trial. See R110 passim. A comparison
of Defendant's facts and argument to the State's Statement of the Case and Facts
above readily demonstrates Defendant's marshaling failures.
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For example, Defendant does not mention, until the last section of his
brief, that Mangum's contract was with American Star Lending, and not
Keystone. See Br.Aplt at 22-23. Even there, Defendant fails to note that he
issued the partial deed of trust to Mangum only after Abbott had severed his
business partnership with Defendant. R110:25-26; R i l l (Def. Ex. 7).
Defendant concedes that he had no "explicit, verbal authority to use
[Abbott's] signature on the partial deed of trust delivered to Mr. Mangum" in
January, 2009. Br.Aplt at 7; see also R110:91-92, 95. Defendant ignores,
however, the evidence presented at trial that reveals he also had no written
authority. Defendant then omits that his authority to use Abbott's signature
was limited to correcting errors in recording Abbott related interests that
existed in 2007. See R110:32-33, 88, 91-92. Defendant also ignores that his
authority over the Montana property was merely to liquidate it to repay
Abbott related Keystone investors. See R110:80; R i l l (Def. Ex. 7).
Defendant also omits Abbott's testimony that he had not, as Defendant
contends, regularly pre-authorized the use of his signature on notarized
deeds. See R110:91-92, 164. Defendant also fails to mention that Abbott
denied authorizing an interest in the Montana property for Sam
Kassir/ American Star Lending. R110: 83, 94,111-12; R i l l (Def. Ex. 7 p.7) (list
of names with interest in the Montana property).
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Defendant cites to his 2010 affirmation that he had destroyed "all
known Notarized documents signed by Abbott as proof that he had
authority to use the signatures in 2009. See BrAplt at 22. But Defendant
again fails to note that Abbott entered into the agreement specifically
because: (1) he had discovered Defendant had been using his signature
without authority; (2) he wanted to immediately stop that unauthorized use;
and (3) he wanted to clarify ownership of the Montana property so that it
could be liquidated. See R110:35, 89-90, 111; Rill (Dei. Ex. 15).
In sum, Defendant impermissibly treats the findings made by the trial
court in its judgment of Defendant's guilt as the totality of the evidence. His
marshaling failure to place the trial court's findings in context of the trial
evidence alone justifies affirmance.
C. Alternatively, ample evidence supports Defendant's conviction.
Even if this Court were to excuse Defendant's briefing and marshaling
failures, as explained above and more fully below, ample evidence supported
Defendant's conviction for forgery.
1. The evidence supports the trial court's finding that
Defendant lacked authority to use Abbott's signature.
As stated, a forgery conviction requires using another's name without
authority to do so. See, e.g., State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214,1216 (Utah App.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated-22OCR, may contain errors.

1991) (quoting State v. Collins, 597 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1979)); Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-501 (West Supp. 2011).
Defendant claims that his authority to use Abbott's signature stemmed
from his Keystone management duties. See Br.Aplt. at 16-21. He further
claims that "the written documentation conclusively shows that his authority
to use Mr. Abbott's name lasted from at least 2008 to 2010." See Br.Aplt at 16.
But, as stated, the marshaled evidence contradicts that claim. To the
extent Defendant asserts that permission to use Abbott's signature was
inherent in his duties of managing Keystone, he ignores the well-established
proposition that "one needs the authority of the person whose name is
signed." Gonzalez, 822 P.2d at 1216 (finding defendant's belief that she had
permission from third party irrelevant). It therefore does not matter whether
the property belonged to Abbott or to Keystone.14 What does matter is that
Defendant used Abbot's signature on a deed of trust that Defendant

Defendant states, for example, that he had authority to act inKey stone's "best interest" and "[i]t was in Keystone's best interest to correct a
partial deed of trust error . . . " See Br.Aplt. at 18. But this is irrelevant to
whether he had Abbott's authority to use Abbott's signature to convey an
interest in the Montana property to Mangum, who was not a Keystone
investor. Also, Defendant mischaracterizes the nature of his conduct. The
partial deed of trust did not merely "correct a partial deed of trust error."
Rather, it purported to convey an interest in property to a stranger both to
Abbott and Keystone.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
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provided to Mangum when Abbott had not given Defendant authority to use
his signature for that purpose. R110:91-92, 94,112.
Abbott testified that he did not, as Defendant contended, regularly
provide pre-notarized signatures for Defendant to use as he wished. R110:9192. Indeed, Abbott testified that he "never gave [Defendant] permission to
use those deeds of trusts to do anything other than the registration" of
Abbott related investors who existed when Abbott signed the partial deeds in
2007. R110:91-92. This testimony alone—which the trial court presumably
believed—was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Defendant
lacked authority to use Abbott's signature on the partial deed of trust.
2. The evidence supports the trial court's finding that
Defendant acted with a purpose to defraud Mangum,
To be guilty of forgery, a defendant must also have a "purpose to
defraud" or "knowledge that the person is facilitating a fraud." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-501(2). See also State v.Winward, 909 P.2d 909, 912-13 (Utah App.
1999) ("noting forgery conviction requires "the intent to defraud and . . . the
act was done in furtherance of that intention"); State ex rel. P.S., 2001 UT App
305, fl 17,38 P.3d 303 (finding "purpose to defraud" requires that a defendant
act with "the knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud.") (internal citations
omitted).
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Defendant claims that the trial court did not find that he acted with the
"intent to defraud." BrAplt at 11. But the trial court expressly found that
Defendant acted with a purpose to defraud: Defendant had "no authority to
sign and he was trying to defraud in accordance with what the elements are
of the charge." R110:223. Defendant alternatively claims that this finding is
inconsistent, as a matter of law, with the court's statement that Defendant
may have been "trying to do the right thing." See BrAplt at 12. But, in
context, no inherent inconsistency exists. As the trial court recognized, the
fact that Defendant might have hoped to "later . . . fix the situation" does not
necessarily mean that he did not act with the purpose to defraud Mangum.
R110:223.
"Knowledge or intent is a state of mind generally to be inferred from
the person's conduct viewed in light of all the accompanying circumstances."
State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, 1 10, 988 P.2d 949 (citations omitted).
This Court has defined a purpose to defraud as "simply a purpose to use a
false writing as if it were genuine to gain some advantage/' State ex ret P.S.,
2001 UT App 305, f 17 (quoting State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah
App. 1991)) (quotations omitted, emphasis in original).
A purpose to defraud can be inferred from "the act of completing the
[unauthorized] check."

Gonzalez, 822 P.2d at 1216 (finding purpose to
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defraud implied where defendant "proffered the check . . . as if genuine" in
order to gain "extra cash"). Thus, evidence that a defendant used a check,
payable to himself, which the account holder testified he had not written,
was sufficient evidence to support a jury's finding that a check was forged.
State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 223 (Utah 1985). See also Kihlsfrom, 1999 UT
App 289, Tff 13,18. ("Under current Utah law a person who merely utters a
forged instrument can be inferred to have knowledge of the forgery").
Defendant cites two cases to support his position: State v. Winward, 909
P.2d 909, 912-13 (Utah App. 1995); and State v. Turner, 282 P.2d 1045, 1047
(Utah 1955). Neither case helps Defendant. Turner is a sodomy case in which
forgery is merely listed as an example of a crime requiring a "specific
wrongful intent." Id. In Winward, the defendant was accused of falsely
endorsing a check written to someone else. 909 P.2d at 911. This Court
reversed his forgery conviction because the trial evidence and jury
instructions did not clearly identify the "easily identifiable" victim as the
person to whom the check was written. Id. at 912-14. Instead, the State also
"suggested] defendant had committed wrongful acts" against other victims,
which were largely irrelevant to the alleged forgery. Id.
Here, the State clearly identified Mangum as the intended victim of
Defendant's fraudulent conduct. The evidence supports the reasonable
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inference—which the trial court apparently drew—that Defendant acted with
the purpose to defraud Mangum.

As stated, the evidence shows that

Defendant, knowing he lacked authority to use Abbott's signature to convey
an interest to Mangum, did so anyway. The reasonable inference is that he
did so to falsely convince Mangum that his investment was secured as
promised in Mangum's agreement with American Star Lending. These facts
support the additional reasonable inference that Defendant acted to gain
some advantage - to forestall Mangum from withdrawing his investment or
taking legal action. This supports the trial court's finding that Defendant
acted with the purpose to defraud.
Because the trial court's finding supports no other reasonable inference
than that Defendant acted with a purpose to defraud, its finding is adequate.
See Hill v. Estate of Allred, 2009 UT 28, tlf 61-62, 216 P.3d 929 ("[b]ecause the
district court's findings support no inference other than that it found against
Defendants' affirmative defenses, . . . its findings of fact and conclusions of
law were adequate").
But even if this court were to find that the trial court failed to make a
specific finding on the element of "purpose to defraud," any error was
harmless. The undisputed evidence "clearly established" that Defendant had
the purpose to defraud and any "absent findings can reasonably be implied."
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See Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah App 1993). See also Madsen v.
Washington Mut Bank FSB, 2008 UT 69, ^ 26, 199 P.3d 898 (noting an
appellate court has discretion to "affirm the judgment appealed from if it is
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent in the record").
Defendant could not explain why the agreed interest payments to
Magnum suddenly stopped.

R110:131. He was under pressure from

Mangum to provide documentation that Mangum's $172,000 investment in
American Star Lending was secured as the agreement required. See R110:13132; R i l l (Def. Ex. 3). Defendant repeatedly falsely asserted that the deed
attached to Abbott's signature was genuine proof of a security agreement,
despite Abbott's contention it was not. See R110:30,135-39,140,141,154-55,
164. It is reasonable to infer that Defendant provided Mangum with the deed
to assuage his concerns, keep his money, and prevent him from consulting
authorities.
The evidence therefore supports Defendant's forgery conviction.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted 16 December 2011.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A
Statute
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501. Forgery and producing false identification-Elements of
offense—Definitions
(1) As used in this part:
(a) "Authentication feature" means any hologram, watermark, certification, symbol, code,
image, sequence of numbers or letters, or other feature that either individually or in
combination with another feature is used by the issuing authority on an identification
document, document-making implement, or means of identification to determine if the
document is counterfeit, altered, or otherwise falsified.
(b) "Document-making implement" means any implement, impression, template,
computer file, computer disc, electronic device, computer hardware or software, or
scanning, printing, or laminating equipment that is specifically configured or primarily
used for making an identification document, a false identification document, or another
document-making implement.
(c) "False authentication feature" means an authentication feature that:
(i) is genuine in origin but that, without the authorization of the issuing authority, has
been tampered with or altered for purposes of deceit;
(ii) is genuine, but has been distributed, or is intended for distribution, without the
authorization of the issuing authority and not in connection with a lawfully made
identification document, document-making implement, or means of identification to
which the authentication feature is intended to be affixed or embedded by the issuing
authority; or
(iii) appears to be genuine, but is not.
(d) "False identification document" means a document of a type intended or commonly
accepted for the purposes of identification of individuals, and that:
(i) is not issued by or under the authority of a governmental entity or was issued under
the authority of a governmental entity but was subsequently altered for purposes of
deceit; and
(ii) appears to be issued by or under the authority of a governmental entity.
(e) "Governmental entity" means the United States government, a state, a political
subdivision of a state, a foreign government, a political subdivision of a foreign
government, an international governmental organization, or a quasi-governmental
organization.
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(f) "Identification document" means a document made or issued by or under the authority
of a governmental entity, which, when completed with information concerning a
particular individual, is of a type intended or commonly accepted for the purpose of
identification of individuals.
(g) "Issuing authority" means:
(i) any governmental entity that is authorized to issue identification documents, means of
identification, or authentication features; or
(ii) a business organization or financial institution or its agent that issues a financial
transaction card as defined in Section 76-6-506.
(h) "Means of identification" means any name or number that may be used, alone or in
conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual, including:
(i) name, Social Security number, date of birth, government issued driver license or
identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, or
employer or taxpayer identification number;
(ii) unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image, or other
unique physical representation; or
(iii) unique electronic identification number, address, or routing code.
(i) "Personal identification card" means an identification document issued by a
governmental entity solely for the purpose of identification of an individual.
(j) "Produce" includes altering, authenticating, or assembling.
(k) "State" includes any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any other commonwealth, possession, or territory of
the United States.
(1) "Traffic" means to:
(i) transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of an item to another, as consideration for
anything of value; or
(ii) make or obtain control of with intent to transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of an
item to another.
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(m) "Writing" includes printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any other method
of recording valuable information including forms such as:
(i) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and any other
symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification;
(ii) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a government
or any agency; or
(iii) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an
interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any person
or enterprise.
(2) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge
that the person is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, the person:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters the altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any
writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance,
transference, publication, or utterance:
(i) purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent;
(ii) purports to be an act on behalf of another party with the authority of that other party;
or
(iii) purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other
than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when an original did not exist.
(3) It is not a defense to a charge of forgery under Subsection (2)(b)(ii) if an actor signs
his own name to the writing if the actor does not have authority to make, complete,
execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish, or utter the writing on behalf of the party
for whom the actor purports to act.
(4) A person is guilty of producing or transferring any false identification document who:
(a) knowingly and without lawful authority produces, attempts, or conspires to produce
an identification document, authentication feature, or a false identification document that
is or appears to be issued by or under the authority of an issuing authority;
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(b) transfers an identification document, authentication feature, or a false identification
document knowing that the document or feature was stolen or produced without lawful
authority;
(c) produces, transfers, or possesses a document-making implement or authentication
feature with the intent that the document-making implement or the authentication feature
be used in the production of a false identification document or another document-making
implement or authentication feature; or
(d) traffics in false or actual authentication features for use in false identification
documents, document-making implements, or means of identification.
(5) A person who violates:
(a) Subsection (2) is guilty of a third degree felony; and
(b) Subsection (4) is guilty of a second degree felony.
(6) This part may not be construed to impose criminal or civil liability on any law
enforcement officer acting within the scope of a criminal investigation.
(7) The forfeiture of property under this part, including any seizure and disposition of the
property and any related judicial or administrative proceeding, shall be conducted in
accordance with Title 24, Chapter 1, Utah Uniform Forfeiture Procedures Act.
(8) The court shall order, in addition to the penalty prescribed for any person convicted of
a violation of this section, the forfeiture and destruction or other disposition of all illicit
authentication features, identification documents, false transaction cards, documentmaking implements, or means of identification.
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ADDENDUM B
Transcript of Trial Court's Oral Findings
Rl 10:220-24
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2

put things aown trie rudu. uaiitany, v«i.u«. ..<

3

smoke and mirrors. And that's what he has done today.

everything into Keystone. So why didn't - if that

4

Same thing, he has document after document that he's

document was transferring an interest to Mr. Mangum,

5

used to try to deceive these people, and, you know,

why does it have Scott Abbott's name on there? That's

6

gave Mr. Mangum this, and then continued to try to

a fraud right there. He has no authority to pass

7

negotiate with him so he could figure out some way to

anything because, according to Counsel, he's already

8

appease him without actually giving the money back,

given all of his interest to Keystone. And so that

9

and by transferring things to him in which there was

Counsel, to transfer anything out of Keystone.
Their argument is that he transferred

~

document that was given to Mr. Mangum should have said

10

no interest. That's exactly what he's done today:

either that it was signed by Mr. Robbennolt as himself

11

Just given you document after document that is just

or as representing Keystone Venture Group. They were

12

smoke and mirrors, Judge, and we would ask the Court

the only people then that had any authority to

13

to find him guilty of the forgery.

transfer any of that to Mr. Mangum.

14

Now, Counsel talked about: Where's the

15
16

fraud?

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Amber,
let's make sure that the exhibits get back to me.
Let me first say, thank you, Counsel.

17

Respect is a big part of what we do here in the court

first of all, that that document purported to be the

18

system. I see that being shown today. Not only for

act of Scott Abbott and it was not. He testified

19

each other but to the Court as well as to the

clearly to you, he'd never authorized his signature to

20

witnesses who testified and all others that were

be on that document. He would not have done that.

21

involved and you should be commended for that.

The document was prepared after the bad blood was

22

My plan is to review these documents,

Okay, here's the fraud. The fraud is,

between them. Even by the dates that they have, it

23

these exhibits that have been presented, go over my

was transferred when there wasn't - there wasn't any

24

notes and come back with a verdict today. I don't

business dealings between Mr. Abbott and, again, he

25

think that it will take me, hopefully, as long as a
219

217
1

jury would. But I think that I have taken enough

2

notes and I know what I need to look at and what I

Defendant set this up, because then if Mr. Mangum came

3

want to look at, in my mind. So, if you wouldn't mind

back and sued somebody, he could say: "You can't sue

4

waiting around. And if I think it's going to take

Keystone. This is signed by Mr. Abbott." And so his

5

longer, I'll have Amber just get your cellphone

only recourse would have been against Mr. Abbott, who

6

numbers and then I'll get back with you before too

had no interest and no ability to sign any documents

7

long. But I'd like to take care of this today. And

or transfer them.

8

that way we can move forward with this.

had no authority to make any transfer at that time.
And that's — that's exactly the way the

Now, Mr. Mangum gave the Defendant

9

So, we'll be in recess.

approximately $175,000. He was to get — there were a

10

(Recess.)

couple of things he was to get in return. He was

11

THE COURT: Thank you, please be seated.

supposed to get payments, monthly payments, and also

12

Okay. We are back on the record in the

an interest in that property. He did not get those

13

matter of State of Utah versus Kelly James Robbennolt,

things.

14

Case 091401782

The document that was given to him gave

15

him absolutely nothing because it had Scott Abbott's

16

name on it, because it was never recorded and because

17

there wasn't - there was no equity in the property to

18

charge the Forgery, a Third Degree Felony being

be given to him. And so the document was completely

19

alleged against Mr. Robbennolt.

fraudulent.

20
It was supposed to be giving him a secured

interest, which it did not do. It did not give him
anything.
Judge, I think clearly the Defendant
structured this so that he could try to keep

21

All parties are present, including the
Defendant, Mr. Robbennolt.
This is a criminal action involving the

After having heard the evidence and
testimony of three witnesses, Mr. Abbott, Mr. Mangum,

22

as well as Mr. Nixon, that's all the witness testimony

23

that I received along with the exhibits that I have

24

had"a chance to overlook. And there were some other

25

additional information provided by Mr. Hartley
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background for what happened here.
And the proof in criminal cases is beyond
a reasonable doubt.
The State has that burden and in this case

2

regarding the transaction by Mr. Robbennolt? Not that

3

I could see. He did this on his own. Normally in

j

4

business relationships, I would think, especially when

j
I

5

that interest is gone, that authority would still be

for the charge of Forgery, it's pretty clear as to the

6

out of respect and trust, at least asked of, mentioned

first few elements: It's no question that

7

to, something. But I don't see that that was the case

Mr. Robbennolt, on-or about January 9th, 2009, Utah

8

here as well.

County, did submit a document to Mr. Mangum,

9

And I put down here as well: Why didn't

purporting to transfer an interest in some property in

10

Montana. That was signed by Mr. Abbott. That's been

11

Because he couldn't. He needed Mr. Abbott's

acknowledged. There's no dispute as to that.

12

signature; that'authority wasn't given. And, again,

13

it seems to me that Mr. Robbennolt was trying to do

The question is: Did he do that to

the Defendant, Mr. Robbennolt, sign his own name?

!

defraud? Was his purpose to defraud? And so I've set

14

what he could to make things right. I think you get

i

forth some things here that I want to mention.

15

yourself involved in these kind of things and you do

j

16

things to try and make it right and then you hope that

Credibility of the witnesses is always at
issue in these types of cases. No question that's

17

later you can fix the situation. This is a lot of

what it usually comes down to. And we had three

18

money involved. And I think he was trying to do the

witnesses today, and in my mind in watching and

19

right thing, but it doesn't detract from fact that no

j
j

listening, in trying to establish what their thinking

20

authority to sign and he was trying to defraud in

might have been, it's dear to me that all parties

21

accordance with what the elements are of the charge.

were credible in what they were trying to relate to

22

Therefore, based upon that, the Court does

23 judge Mr. Robbennolt guilty of the crime of Forgery, a

the Court.
And so I would commend them for that. Not
always do we get witnesses up that tell the truth, but

24

Third Degree Felony. And therefore, at this point, we

25

just need to set a time for sentencing.
223

221
I think that was the case today. All witnesses were

1

relating their remembrance of the facts in a way that

2

AP&P; is that the State's request as well?

was truthful.

3

MS. RAGAN: It is, Your Honor.

|

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Robbennolt,

j

Money, money, money is what we're dealing

-

4

Mr. Hartley, shall we refer the matter to

with here. That's the ultimate cause of what's going

5

you'll need to report to Adult Probation and Parole no

on. And then I put down here: Trust, trust, trust.

6

later than 4:00 o'clock tomorrow, provide them

That's what I was getting from the testimony and what

7

information they need to complete a presentence

was being relayed.

8
9

report.

No question the Court does find that

Sentencing in this matter will be set for

Mr. Robbennolt had no authority to sign on

10

- it looks like April the 11th at 9:30 in the

Mr. Abbott's behalf. This is relayed by the fact that

11

morning.

Mr. Abbott's signature was needed because the property

12

was in his name. He had to sign even though

13

not sure that you need to prepare findings in order.

Mr. Robbennolt was part of Keystone because of his

14

We can just use our minute entry, but that will be

history or background. At least in this transaction,

15

your choice.

he wasn't a signer. It was all in Mr. Abbott's name.

16

I felt that conspicuously absent from the
documents I received was something from Mr. Kasir in

17
18

Your Honor, so...
THE COURT: Again, I appreciate Counsel

the agreement that he entered into with Keystone with

19

and their efforts today. I would like to keep these

regard to his interest.

20

exhibits at least until such time as sentencing.

I
<
j
j

Where it is a bench trial, Ms. Ragan, I'm

_
_

MS. RAGAN: I did take some notes,
j

21

Did you want these back, Mr. Hartley?

had signed off on that agreement and where that is, I

22
23

These weren't actually j
MR. HARTLEY: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor, j

don't know. But I thought maybe that could have been

24

I didn't have that. I would have like to
have maybe seen that to see if, in fact, Mr. Abbott

important here.

THE COURT: And is that date going to be
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